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The much maligned 1982 merger merry-go-round which eventually in-
volved four of the nation's major firms (Bendix, Martin Marietta, Allied,
and United Technologies) was initiated by one man, William Agee, then
the CEO of Bendix, After it became clear that Bendix would not succeed
at acquiring Martin Marietta and that it would, in fact, be acquired by
Allied acting as a "white knight," Mr. Agee convinced Bendix's board of
directors to approve "golden parachute" (GP) contracts for himself and
fifteen other Senior Bendix executives. ^
Mr. Agee's contract entitled him to over $4 million in compensation
(over $800,000 per year for five years) upon 1) a change of control at
Bendix, and 2) Agee's termination, either voluntary or involuntary. Eight
days after Allied acquired Bendix, Agee voluntarily chose to resign and
receive his $4 million. The storm surrounding this particular merger con-
troversy highlighted what many believe to be an abuse of managerial power,
namely, golden parachute contracts.
Although Agee is but one of a handful of executives to exploit this new
managerial perquisite, the number of executives who have GPs in their
employment contracts is significant. One study estimates that the number
of executive emplo5nTient contracts containing GPs more than doubled
between 1979 and 1982.^ Estimates of the percentage of firms that have
awarded their managers such contracts range from 25 to 50.^ In the Bendix
merger, 16 Bendix executives, 28 Martin Marietta executives, 2 Allied
executives and 64 United Technologies executives were covered by GPs."
The increasing number of GPs has led one writer to suggest that GPs are
"the hottest new executive suite perk. "^
This article is an extension of earlier work presented at the National Academy of Manage-
ment Meetings and Published in its Proceedings, 1983.
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Even though GPs seem to be reasonably well accepted in corporate
circles, the public response to GPs has been less than favorable. The
Washington Post described GPs as "executive incompetence insurance. "^
Business Week referred to GPs as "the gilded ripoff' and argued that the
ethical differences between GPs and theft are "hard to discern. "^  Editorials
and articles which criticize GPs have also appeared in Forbes and Fortune. *
GPs at Bendix, Brunswick, Gulf Resources and Chemical, and Conoco
have been the targets of shareholder suits, and both Congress and a
government-commissioned panel stud5dng takeover regulation are investi-
gating various methods for controlling the use of golden parachutes.^
To date, the study of GPs has not kept pace with the growing controversy
surrounding them. Research relating to GPs remains largely anecdotal and
continues to be based on rather amorphous definitions and samples. A
closer look is necessary.
What Is a Golden Parachute?
A golden parachute provides "employment-contract provisions that guaran-
tee them (usually top executives) cash settlements equal to several years'
salaries if their company changes hands. "^ ° For descriptive purposes such
a definition suffices, but for analytical purposes this definition must be
examined in more detail. Aside from one criterion—change of control—this
definition does little to differentiate GPs from other types of severance
pay. Does the amount of compensation or the organizational position of
the recipient distinguish GPs from other severance pay agreements? Or is the
difference between a GP and severance pay explained by the fact that
GPs are a component of individual employment contracts while severance
pay is determined by company policy? Distinguishing GPs on the basis of
organizational position, size of compensation, or the vehicle of implemen-
tation seems fruitless.
A factor which does distinguish GPs from traditional severance pay
does exist, however, and that factor is voluntary, as well as involuntary,
termination. If, after a change in control, an employee chooses to resign
from the acquired company and thereby receives severance compensation,
then the employee is, indeed, benefiting from a GP. Although involuntary
termination is still a possibility under a GP agreement, it is the possibility
of voluntary termination which distinguishes GPs from traditional severance
pay. In short, the ability "to pull the ripcord" is the second distinguishing
factor in our definition of a GP.
Another point which must be considered in relation to the definition of
a GP pertains to guaranteed employment. A guaranteed employment pro-
vision in an executive's contract says that after a change in control the
executive is guaranteed a specified position for a given number of years.
In some cases the guarantee goes on to say that if the executive's position
is changed, the executive may choose to resign and collect the compensa-
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tion which he/she would earn through the remainder of the guarantee
period. The determination of whether a position has changed is most offen
left with the affected executive. In many other cases, however, it is not
specified as to what would happen if the executive chooses to leave the
company or if the executive chooses to minimize his/her activity within
the company and maximize activity in other endeavors. Because of the
clear control which the executive has in the first case and the ambiguity
which exists in the second case, guaranteed employment provisions are
also a component of our definition of a golden parachute.
In sum, GPs may be defined as provisions which allow for corporate
executives to receive severance compensation if they are voluntarily or
involuntarily terminated affer a change of control. Guaranteed employment
provisions are a particular type of GP.
Who Has Golden Parachutes?
As noted earlier, the estimates of the percentage of major firms granting
GPs vary from 25 percent to 50 percent. Part of the wide variation in
these estimates may stem from differences in the definition of GPs.
Further, it is possible that many GPs may have been draffed but not yet
formally enacted—implementation could therefore await the actual tender-
ing of a hostile takeover bid, thereby saving firms the embarrassment of
disclosing GPs. Another explanation for the differences could be different
sample populations.
In an effort to provide a base from which future research might be
conducted, the authors undertook an intensive examination of the proxy
statements of all of the 1981 Fortune 500 companies. Content analysis of
the proxy statements was conducted throughout the summer and fall of
1982. To gather the most current information available, the 1982 proxy
statements were examined. With the 1980 amendments of Item 4 of
Regulation S-K, the SEC requires "after the fact" disclosure of special
executive compensation programs in proxy statements or 10-K re-
ports. For consistency, the proxy statements were chosen as the data
source. The definition of a GP developed in the preceding section was
used to determine which firms in the 1981 Fortune 500 had golden
parachutes for their executives.
We determined that 55 (eleven percent) of the 1981 Fortune 500 firms
had GPs in place. Of the 55 firms, 39 had GPs that were clearly defined,
i.e., after a change of control the executive could voluntarily leave the
company and receive previously agreed upon compensation. Five firms
had guaranteed employment provisions that allowed the executive to re-
ceive compensation if the executive believed that his/her position had been
altered. Eleven firms had guaranteed employment provisions with no future
specifications. Table 1 presents the list of the 1981 Fortune 500 firms that
had GPs at the time of their 1982 proxy statements.
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Table 1: Firms with Gotden Parachutes
(n = 55)
Air Products Dexter Phelps-Dodge
and Chemicals Diamond Shamrock** Phillips Petroleum
Allied Emhart Robertson, H. H.
Allis-Chalmers* Ferro Schering-Plough
American Bakeries FMC Sheller-Globe*
AMF Genesco** Stanley Works
Amstar Gulf Resources Sterling Drugs
Arcata and Chemicals Stokely-VanCamp
Bendix Harnischfeger Sun Co.
Brunswick* International Paper Sunbeam
Bucyrus-Erie** Kimberly-Clark Superior Oil
Ceco** Louisiana Pacific Thiokol**
Celanese Manville Time, Inc.
Clorox Midland-Ross** Todd Shipyards
Colt Industries** Mohasco Uniroyal**
Conoco* Morton-Norwich** United Technologies
Control Data National Gypsum** U.S. Industries
Dana** National Steel Warnaco*
Data General Peabody International Williams Co.
* Guaranteed employment where a lump sum payment would be made if the executive chose
to leave after a change in control.
** Guaranteed employment after a change in control. No specifications were made beyond
the guarantee.
Table 2: Industries* Represented in Sample
(number of firms from each industry)
Aerospace (1) Natural Resources—Fuel (4)
Appliances (1) Office Equipment, Computers (2)
Automotive (3) Paper and Forest Products (3)
Building Materials (2) Personal Care Products (1)
Chemicals (8) Publishing, Radio and TV
Conglomerates (2) Broadcasting (1)
Drugs (2) Service (2)
Food Processing (3) Special Machinery (4)
General Machinery (2) Steel (1)
Leisure Time (2) Textiles, Apparel (2)
Metals and Mining (2) Tires and Rubber (1)
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (6)
* Using industries as broken down in Business Week's "Annual Corporate Scoreboard" (March
15, 1982).
The industries represented by these 55 firms are noted in Table 2.
Firms in the chemical industry and in miscellaneous manufacturing ac-
counted for 8 of the 55 and 6 of the 55 firms, respectively. Overall, 22
industries are represented in our list of 55 firms with GPs. With the
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Table 3: 1981 Fortune 500 Ranks of Firms
with Golden Parachutes
Ranks
1-50
51-100
101-150
151-200
201-250
251-300
301-350
351-^00
401^50
451-500
#
4
4
6
8
7
2
6
5
6
% of Sample
7.3
7.3
10.9
14.5
12.7
3.6
10.9
9.1
10.9
Cumulative
Percent
7.3
14.6
25.5
40.0
52.7
56.3
67.2
76.3
87.2
% in each
hundred
14.6
25.4
16.3
20.0
23.6
12.7 99.9
possible exceptions of chemicals and miscellaneous manufacturing, GPs
seem to be no more prevalent in one industry than another.
In addition to determining which firms and industries had GPs, we also
examined the factor of company size. First, the 55 firms were ranked
against the Fortune 500 firms. As indicated in Table 3, the firms issuing
golden parachutes were rather evenly distributed throughout the Fortune
500 — the top 100 accounted for 14.6 percent of the 55 firms, the second
100 accounted for 25.4 percent, the third 100 for 16.3 percent, the fourth
100 for 20.0 percent, and the fifth 100 for 23.6 percent. Gross size alone
does not seem to be a major variable for determining which firms have
GPs. This is particularly surprising since one would expect that manage-
ment in larger firms would be less concerned about hostile takeovers and
therefore would be less likely to have GPs implemented.
To examine further the question of size, an additional list was compiled.
This compilation focused on the firm's ranking in its industry as well as
its standing in relation to other Fortune 500 firms from the same industry
(see Table 4). The results of this compilation show again a rather even
distribution. A little over 20 percent of the firms with GPs are in each of
the top two quartiles of their industries. Nevertheless, based on these
data, it does not seem that size of firms is a significant determinant of GPs.
Beyond size, another general characteristic we examined in the 55 firms
with GPs was financial performance. The percentage changes in sales and
profits for each firm were compared to the percentage changes in sales
and profits for the firm's industry composite in Business Week'?, "Annual
Corporate Scoreboard." The comparison was conducted for the years 1980
to 1981 and 1981 to 1982. The results are shown in Table 5.
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Table 4: Industry Quartiles of Firms in Sample*
#
12
12
16
15
Percent of
Sample
21.8
21.8
29.1
27.3
Cumulative
Percent
21.8
43.6
72.1
100.0
Top Quartile*
2nclQuartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
* Firm rankings are by sales using data from Business Week's "Annual Corporate Scoreboard"
(March 15,1982). Only Fortune 500 firms were included in the industry quartile computation.
As shown in the first part of Table 5, 68 percent of the firms with GPs
performed worse than their industry in relation to change in sales from
1980 to 1981; 55.3 percent performed worse than their industry's sales
performance from 1981 to 1982. In relation to profitability, 62.0 percent
did better than their industry from 1980 to 1981, but in a curious reversal,
59.6 percent did worse than their industry from 1981 to 1982.
The second and third parts of Table 5 examine this relationship a bit
more closely. The second part shows that profitability is a less important
factor than sales in the 1980 to 1981 performance of firms with GPs. Of
the 34 firms that had lower sales increases than their industry, half had a
better profit performance and half had a worse profit performance. Firms
with better sales performances than their industries tended to have better
profit performances as well. In terms of the changes from 1981 to 1982,
the performances of the firms are fairly even. Over 38 percent did worse
than their industry on both sales and profits, but slightly over 23 percent
did better than than their industry on both dimensions.
The surest conclusion to draw from the examination of performance
data would be that no relationship exists. However, in both of the examined
time periods, firms with GPs had poorer sales performance than did their
industries. Based on this observation, it seems sales performance is the
important dimension.
In sum, firms with GPs are spread throughout the Fortune 500 and
throughout their respective industries. The firms are more likely to have
performed worse than the industry in relation to sales; profitability perform-
ance does not seem to be an important factor.
What Is Included in a Golden Parachute?
The precise contents of a GP are impossible to determine without having
access to the employment contracts of the executives who have GPs.
From the examination of the proxy statements, however, a general picture
of what is included in a GP can be drawn.
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Table 5. Performance of Firms with
Golden Parachutes
The comparisons in this table are based on Business Week's "Annual Corporate
Scoreboard." The percentage changes in sales and profits for each firm were com-
pared to the percentage changes in sales and profits for the firm's industry composite.
1980 to 1981
Sales
Performance
Firms Performing
Better than [he 12(24.0%)*
Industry
Firms Performing
Worse than the 34(68.0%)
Industry
Firms Performing
Same as the 4(8.0%)
Industry
Total Compared 50
Data Not Available 5
* Percentage of Total Compared
Firms Performing Better than
the Industry on Sales
Firms Performing Worse than
the Industry on Sales
Firms Performing the Same as
the Industry on Sales
Total
Firms Performing Better than
the Industry on Sales
Firms Performing Worse than
the Industry on Sales
Firms Performing the Same as
the Industry on Sales
1980 to 1981
Profit
Performance
31 (62.0%)
19(38.0%)
0 (0.0%)
50
5
for the Category (e
1980 to 1981
Firms Performing
Better than the
Industry on Profit
10
(20.0%)
17
(34.0%)
4
(8.0%)
31
1981 to 1982
Firms Performing
Better than the
Industry on Profit
11
(23.4%)
8
(17.0%)
0
(0.0%)
1981 to 1982 1981 to 1982
Sales Profit
Performance Performance
18(38.3%) 19(40.4%)
26(55.3%) 28(59.6%)
3 (6.4%) 0 (0.0%)
47 47
8 8
.g. 12 is 24.0% of 50).
Firms Performing
Worse than the
Industry on Profit Total
2 12
(4.0%)
17 34
(34.0%)
0 4
(0.0%)
19 50
Firms Performing
Worse than the
Industry on Profit Total
7 18
(14.9%)
18 26
(38.3%)
3 3
(6.4%)
Total 19 28 47
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For example, the number of executives covered by GPs ranges from
one to 80. Thirty-four of the 55 companies (61.8 percent of the sample)
provided GPs to ten or less of their executives; 24 of those companies
(43.6 percent of the sample) provided GPs for five or less of their execu-
tives. In only one case was the coverage ambiguous; at Superior Oil, all
present and future officers were covered by GPs.
Since change of control is a key variable in distinguishing GPs from
severance pay, it too is important in relation to the contents of GPs;
however, in the proxy statements, only 31 percent of the sample defined
what the firm meant by change of control. In approximately half of the
proxy statements where change of control was not defined, it was noted
that the definition of the term could be found in the executives' employment
contracts. Of those companies which did define change of control in their
proxy statements, the definition centered on change in the majority of the
board, accumulated ownership by one entity or a combination of both
factors.
A change of over half the directors in a short time period appears to be
a near-universal GP trigger. However, some firms are also basing the
trigger on changes in accumulated ownership. Often these clauses allow
executives to collect their GPs if any single entity accumulates more than
a given threshold percentage of the firm's outstanding stock. These
thresholds range from 20 to 50 percent. Given this rather liberal definition
of change of control, GPs could be triggered inadvertently. In fact, "when
Gulf & Western's stake in Mohasco, an interior furnishings company, went
over the magic 20% mark, four executives bailed out with some $800,000
among them. "^ ^
In relation to the total dollar commitment under GPs, only two firms
estimated their potential costs. Bendix estimated its costs at $15.7 million
for 16 covered executives, and Gulf Resources and Chemical Group esti-
mated its costs at $9.4 million for 13 executives.
With regard to specific compensation of executives, the costs are as
difficult to measure as total dollar commitment. For example, at H.H.
Robertson the GP compensation is based on a sliding scale over four years,
but at Manville the GP compensation is based on one month of salary for
each year at Manville. In general, GPs provide the equivalent of 1 to 6
years of salary, with 2 to 3 years of salary being the most common com-
pensation. Guaranteed employment contracts generally extend from 3 to
5 years after a change of control or until some specified date, generally
in the second half of the 1980s. Besides compensation based on salaries,
many GPs also include provisions for accelerating stock options and long-
term incentive compensation. Bonuses are also estimated and paid, and
fringe benefits (most often insurance and pension) are included as well.
The total compensation received by an individual is therefore a function
of several variables and, at best, is difficult to determine prior to the
execution of the GP.
GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A CLOSER LOOK 119
A final area of interest concerning the contents of GPs relates to limita-
tions. In 30 of the 55 companies with GPs there was a specified time limit
in which the executive could take advantage of a GP. With the guaranteed
employment provisions, that time limit centered on a date — generally in
the 1980s, as mentioned above. For the lump-sum type of GPs, this
limitation involved a time period from six months to five years after a
change of control. The most frequent time limitation was two years.
In only six of the 55 companies with GPs were there any "offset"
provisions, i.e., provisions which reduce or eliminate GP compensation
or benefits if the executive takes a position with another company. In
three of these six companies the offset related to insurance benefits — in
one company benefits would be reduced by 50 percent, and in the other
two companies benefits may be reduced under certain unspecified cir-
cumstances.
Even though it is impossible to predict the exact contents of a GP, it
is still possible to describe the contents of a "typical" GP. A typical agree-
ment would contain the following:
• coverage for one to 10 executives
• change of control, being defined as a change in the majority of the board
or the acquisition of over 20 percent of the outstanding stock by some
distinguishable party
• compensation consisting of two to three years' salary plus accelerated
stock options, bonuses, and long-term incentive compensation
• insurance benefits for two to three years after a change of control and
pension or retirement provisions
• a two-year time frame after a change of control in which to activate
theGP
The Arguments for and Against Golden Parachutes
Arguments for Golden Parachutes — The following excerpt from the
proxy statement of Superior Oil summarizes three of the key arguments
for GPs:
The Board of Directors is determined that the senior executives of the Company
be able to devote their full attention and energies to the pursuit of the Company's
business under any circumstances and that they not be unsettled by any real or
rumored possibilities of change of control of the Company. The purpose of the Board
of Directors is to assure retention of senior executives to carry on the Company's
business as usual and to assure that, should the Company receive proposals from
third parties with respect to its future, the officers of the Company and its subsidiaries
can, without being influenced by the uncertainties of their own respective situations,
(a) assess such proposals, (b) formulate an objective opinion as to whether or not
such proposals would be in the interest of the Company and its shareholders, and
(c) take such other action regarding such proposals as the Board of Directors might
determine to be appropriate.^^
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Implicit within this statement are three arguments: the objectivity argu-
ment, the loyalty argument, and the retention argument.
The objectivity argument suggests that without assurances about their
futures, executives might be more concerned about their own interests
than about those of the shareholders. Presumably, executives would there-
fore be more concerned about being viewed favorably by their future
boards than by their current boards. GPs eliminate this potential problem
because the executive knows, at least at a minimum, what the future holds.
The loyalty argument implies that GPs are justified on the basis of reward
for past service. Many companies believe that they have a responsibility
to their employees that is nearly as important as their responsibilities to
their stockholders and customers. GPs are one way of assuring that new,
uncaring management does not run roughshod over the firm's old, loyal
employees.
The retention argument is probably the one most commonly used to
defend GPs. The suggestion is that GPs encourage executives to stay
with their firms, both during a takeover attempt and after the completed
takeover. This argument presupposes that without GPs the uncertainties
surrounding a takeover might be sufficient to cause a number of key
executives to "jump ship" at a time of severe organizational trial. GPs
therefore "buy" the continued leadership of senior management. As such,
GPs are merely another form of executive compensation similar to bonuses,
stock options, etc. In fact, they could be viewed as just another facet of
a total executive compensation package.
Beyond these three arguments lies what might be called the cost argu-
ment. This argument proposes that GPs add to the acquisition cost of a
takeover, thus becoming a legitimate means of forcing the acquirer to
re-evaluate his intentions. Since GPs go into effect only in the event of a
successful takeover, they can be used as a device for raising the price to
the "raider" but not to a compatible "white knight." A second aspect of
this argument is that the cost of GPs is actually borne by the stockholders
of the acquiring firm and not the stockholders of the executives' firm.
Issues of fiduciary responsibility are therefore irrelevant to the GP contract.
Arguments Against Golden Parachute — In general, the criticism of
GPs centers on four arguments — the managerial performance argument,
the "arm's length" argument, the fiduciary responsibility argument, and
the public relations argument. Most of the criticism stems from the suspi-
cion that GPs are implemented in order to benefit existing management
and not necessarily shareholders.
The managerial performance argument has several dimensions. The first
dimension relates back to the objectivity argument for GPs and suggests
that GPs are compensating managers to perform as they already should.
This argument is based on the "trustee" notion of management, i.e..
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management serves as a trustee of shareholder property and is therefore
already charged with maximizing shareholder wealth. To provide additional
compensation in order to get managers to objectively evaluate takeover
offers is tantamount to management extortion of the shareholders.
Another dimension of the managerial performance argument relates to
the relationship between managerial performance and takeovers. Take-
overs generally occur only when some external group believes that they
can manage the firm's assets more efficiently than current management.
This argument suggests that GPs are nothing more than multi-million -
dollar rewards to executives who have so mismanaged a company that the
company's stock price is depressed to the extent that an outside group is
willing to pay a considerable sum in order to gain control of the target's
assets. Recent evidence suggests that takeovers result in gains to the
stockholders ranging from 14 percent to 50 percent." Thus firms which
become takeover targets are vulnerable because their current management
is very inefficient.
The "arm's length" argument focuses on the relationship between execu-
tives and their boards of directors. The central premise of this argument
is that executives, through control of their boards of directors, give them-
selves the golden parachutes. GPs are thus seen as yet another manifes-
tation of the effects on a firm when control shifts from stockholders to
managers—a phenomenon first discussed by Berle and Means in 1932
and thoroughly documented in the past two decades^'' There is generally
little argument about compensation levels that are determined in a free
market. However, substantial evidence indicates that management does
control the boards of many major firms, and thus GPs become more a
function of management's political control and less a function of the supply
and demand of senior managers.
The fiduciary responsibility argument is based on the relationship between
management and stockholders. This argument equates GPs with theft.
For example, given that a "raiding" firm is willing to pay only so much to
acquire a target firm, and given that the target successfully pumps up the
costs that the raider must pay, then the target is worth correspondingly
less. For every additional million dollars that a raider must pay in GPs, a
million dollars is taken from the target's shareholders.
Finally, the public relations argument suggests that GPs are irresponsi-
ble. In a time of economic hardship and union givebacks, news of GPs can
prove, at best, to be a serious embarrassment. Even if GPs can be justified
economically or ethically, one must ask whether or not the existence of
GPs compensates for the various costs associated with the negative pub-
licity they arouse — costs which may eventually include additional govern-
ment regulation.
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Discussion
The Legal Perspective — There have been at least four shareholder
suits brought in relation to GPs. Further, both Congress and a govemment-
commissioned panel studying takeover regulation are considering various
methods for controlling GPs. Still, at this time, GPs do not appear to be
illegal. In fact, the legality of GPs has rested on "the business judgment
rule." The business judgment rule can be interpreted to suggest that
"management has the right, and even the duty, to oppose a tender offer
it determines contrary to the firm's best interest. "^ ^ To the extent that
management can successfully claim that GPs aid opposition to hostile tender
offers, the courts are likely to uphold these agreements. The business
judgment rule has served as an effective shield against virtually all suits
that question management decisions — decisions which include the im-
plementation of GPs.
The unanswered legal question, however, centers on management's
relationship to the members of the board. More specifically, the concern
is with the separation of senior-level management decision making and
decision making by the board. For example, in the Gulf Resources case
the role of Robert H. Allen is at issue. The new board controlling Gulf
Resources has refused to pay Allen's GP because Allen was both Chairman
of the Board and CEO of Gulf Resources prior to its acquisition. The new
board claims that "as chairman he [Allen] ratified the decision to cover
him and his fellow officers with the severance plan, which reportedly
amounted to some $13 million. "^ ^ Thus, the old board "did not have the
degree of independence and disinterestedness necessary to authorize the
(parachute) agreement. "^ ^
The question of management and board decision making is further com-
plicated when, as in the case of the Brunswick Corporation, directors as
well as managers receive GPs. At Brunswick, any outside director over
55 years of age with more than five years' service may quit after a hostile
takeover and continue receiving an annual retainer of $22,000 for life.^ *
Given such circumstances as those in Gulf Resources and those in
Brunswick, there is a definite possibility that the courts may actually set
a new precedent in the area of GPs.
Still, the legal community is strongly divided over GPs. ^ ^ Some attorneys
see GPs as nothing more than common-law fraud. Others view GPs as
no different from other executive perquisites. The more moderate view
of GPs and perhaps the most likely view for the future is that GPs will be
considered on a case-by-case basis and no precedent will be established.
In rendering their decisions, the courts will examine the time at which a
GP was enacted and whether or not the board provided due consideration.
The Ethical Perspective — Even if GPs are legal, they are not neces-
sarily ethical. In fact, it is difficult to find any ethical justification for them.
GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A CLOSER LOOK 123
This isn't to suggest that high compensation in itself is unethical since
fortunes of a major company often turn on the judgment of senior manage-
ment. Income differentials are a necessary element of a market economy
and one that helps drive it toward efficiency. Rather, the ethical validity
of GPs hinges upon considerations of management's responsibilities to its
shareholders during takeover attempts.
Consider, for example, the previously discussed arguments for GPs —
the objectivity, loyalty, retention, and cost arguments. None of these
arguments unambiguously meets the objective of improving shareholder
wealth. The objectivity argument hinges on the assumption that senior
management will act first in its own self-interest and second in the sharehold-
ers' interests. Given that this assumption is true, what does a GP contrib-
ute? As the critics of GPs point out, a GP may serve as a "bribe" to get
management to do what it should be doing anjrway. Furthermore, a GP
might also remove the incentive for management to see the best deal for
the firm. Once a GP is implemented, the connection between management's
self-interest and shareholder interests is completely severed. If it is as-
sumed that managers act in their own self-interest without a GP, why
is it assumed that they will disregard that self-interest once a GP is pro-
vided? Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel have presented a
powerful case for total managerial passivity in the face of a takeover; they
contend that any managerial resistance ultimately decreases shareholder
wealth.^'' Ironically, however, that position is not taken by the advocates
of GPs. Instead, GPs are somehow supposed to motivate senior manage-
ment to aggressively seek the best deal for the shareholders. Given the
assumption of managerial self-interest, the logic of the argument is strained
at best.
Similarly, the loyalty argument seems flawed. A firm is a takeover target
(generally at a premium over recent market price) because some other
company believes that it can manage the firm's resources considerably
more efficiently than can existing management. In other words, the market
has given the management of the target a failing grade. Why would share-
holders want to reward that management group with golden parachutes?
The retention argument for GPs is equally questionable. Most takeover
specialists scoff at the notion that management is likely to depart during
a takeover attempt. They note that there is virtually no evidence of man-
agers bailing out in a time of crisis. Rather, the group dynamics of senior
management are such that to do so would be seen as "disloyal" and the
person bailing out would lose face.^ ^
Finally, the cost argument from the shareholders' view seems flawed.
Given that the market determines the value of a target in a takeover
attempt, driving the cost up for a raider but not for a white knight serves
only one interest — management's. Do shareholders really care whether
their stock is acquired by a raider or a white knight? More than likely they
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don't — but management does. What then, besides a possible transfer of
funds from shareholders to managers, does a GP accomplish?
Our conclusion is that from the shareholders' perspective, GPs are of
little value. GPs serve management's interests by reducing the uncertainty
and costs resulting from management performance, but GPs do little for
shareholders. The authors see GPs as a direct and unjustified transfer of
wealth from shareholders to managers. This makes them unethical.
Conclusion
When William Agee pulled the ripcord on his golden parachute, he provoked
a major controversy in both the popular and the business press over abuses
of managerial perquisites. Though there have been a few notable instances
of golden parachutes being refused by senior management, ^ ^ the trend
appears to be toward even greater use of this perquisite.
The widespread public perception that the mere existence of golden
parachutes is fundamentally perverse is fueled by the fact that they reward
the captains of the losing side. These negative public perceptions led in
March 1983 to the establishment of an SEC advisory panel on takeovers
and associated practices. Whether new regulations would take the form
of prohibiting GPs or the form proposed by Easterbrook and Fischel of
eliminating management's right to oppose a takeover,^ is not the question
here. Instead, the concern is that GPs are giving American business another
"black eye." The existence of GPs today is similar to the existence of
insider trading prior to 1933; insider trading amounted to theft, even before
it was made illegal. As S. Prakash Sethi has noted, "corporate interests
must emanate from the public interest and cannot be inconsistent with
it. "^ '^  Not only is it in the public interest and shareholder interest to eliminate
GPs, but it is also in the interest of the American business community.
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